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AGENCY-RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR-MASTER'S LIABILITY FOR
THE INTENTIONAL TORTS OF HIS SERVANT COMMITTED
WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT AND IN FURTHERANCE
OF MASTER'S BUSINESS. SPENCE V. NEWTON, 20 Md. App. 126,
316 A.2d 837 (1974).
Basic to the American system of justice is the concept that for every
interference with a legal right there should also exist a corresponding
legal remedy. Often, however, these remedies are left unsatisfied due to
the tortfeasor's financial inability to comply with the judicial sanctions
imposed upon him. This one to one relationship is altered when the
person committing the wrong is an agent of another. Through the
doctrine of respondeat superior the injured party can, in certain circum-
stances, sue both the employee and his employer, notwithstanding the
fact that the employer was not directly responsible for the injuries.
There presently exists considerable disagreement as to the extent to
which plaintiffs should be permitted to utilize the doctrine of re-
spondeat superior as a device to impose vicarious liability upon em-
ployers. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals was confronted with
this issue in the recent case of Newton v. Spence.' Although no new
rules of law were enunciated therein, the court, by failing to consider
all of the doctrine's essential elements, appears to have opened the door
to future unbridled attacks against employers.
The present case originated on the evening of May 25, 1970 when
Michael A. Newton, a part-time sales clerk for Sears, Roebuck &
Company ("Sears"), was accused by a security manager of Sears,
Michael Di Nicolo, of having taken money from the cash register with
the intent of committing a larceny after trust. Di Nicolo acted upon
information supplied by another Sears employee, Edward Spence, who
allegedly observed Newton remove the money and place it in his
pocket.2 Newton was taken into the security office by Di Nicolo where
a search of his person failed to reveal any incriminating evidence.
Nonetheless, Spence steadfastly maintained his accusations. This
resulted in the detention of Newton for approximately two hours. An
audit of the cash register, revealing a deficit of $156.00, prompted
Di Nicolo to press formal charges against Spence.3 At trial, held two
days hence, a verdict of not guilty was rendered.4
Newton sought retribution for his ordeal by instituting an action
against Spence and Di Nicolo, as well as Sears, "alleging that Spence
and Di Nicolo were acting individually, jointly and as agents, servants
and employees of Sears."' Newton's declaration asserted five separate
1. 20 Md. App. 126, 316 A.2d 837 (1974).
2. Id. at 129, 316 A.2d at 839.
3. Id. at 129, 316 A.2d at 840. Subsequently, the audit department of Sears discovered that no
shortage had in tact occurred. This fact was not known to Di Nicolo or Spence when they
testified against the appellant at the larceny trial.
4. Id. at 130, 316 A.2d at 840.
5. Id. at 131-32, -16 A.2d at 841.
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causes of action: Assault and Battery, False Imprisonment, False Ar-
rest, Malicious Prosecution and Slander.6 While there were no new
developments in the Maryland law with regard to the first four charges,
the existing law pertaining to slander in conjunction with the doctrine
of respondeat superior was subtly altered. Accordingly, the emphasis
of this note will be confined to the discussion of this issue. "The jury
by its verdict holding Spence liable for slander, found as a fact that
Spence had maliciously lied when he testified that he observed Newton
stealing from the register." 7 In addition to Spence, the jury, by in-
voking the doctrine of respondeat superior," found Sears to be liable
for slander. As a result, Sears then filed a Motion for Judgment N.O.V.
as to the slander count.9 In granting the motion the trial court
reasoned that since "[tihe jury.., found as a fact that Spence had
maliciously lied ... the law does not permit the jury to find that such
malicious action is binding upon the employer of the slanderer under
the doctrine of respondeat superior."' 0 In essence, the court held the
doctrine of respondeat superior to be inapplicable in those situations,
such as here, where the employee's act was motivated by malice.
On appeal, the trial court's decision sustaining the Motion for Judg-
ment N.O.V. was reversed. The Court of Special Appeals rejected Sears'
contention that a finding by the jury that Spence had maliciously lied,
by definition, precluded the possibility that he may have been concur-
rently acting for the benefit of his employer. This rejection was
founded on the conclusion that a finding of malice does not categori-
cally infer that Spence was "motivated solely and exclusively by some
personal motive .... "'' The court reasoned that an employee may be
motivated by a dual desire to further his employer's interest as well as
his own. By applying a well established rule of construction, the court
noted that after a Motion for Judgment N.O.V. has been introduced, all
evidence and inferences deducible therefrom, pertinent to that issue,
6. Id. at 131-32, 316 A.2d at 841. The trial court verdict was as follows: Assault and Battery
(Count I)-verdict for Di Nicolo and Sears, False Imprisonment and False Arrest (Cqunts II
and III)-$7,500.00 compensatory damages against Di Nicolo and Sears (submitted on both
compensatory and punitive damages), Slander (Count IV)-$1,000.00 punitive damages
against Sears, Malicious Prosecution (Count V)-$2,000.00 compensatory damages against
Spence, $25,000.00 punitive damages against Sears.
7. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 841.
8. The invocation of the doctrine was predicated on the court's instruction to the jury, which
stated:
Sears would be responsible if the jury found Spence was acting within the scope
of his employment and in furtherance of the business of Sears, but that if it found he
was acting "solely and exclusively by some personal motive such as personal dislike
for the plaintiff, Newton, or a grudge against him or some other purely personal
motive not related to his position as an employee of Sears, then whatever action he
took or whatever he said is not binding on his employer .... Id. at 139, 316 A.2d
at 845.
9. A Judgment N.O.V. has been defined as a judgment entered by order of the court,
although there has been a jury verdict for the opposing party. Interstate Motor Freight Sys.
v. Henry, 111 Ind. App. 179. 38 N E.2d 909 (1942).
10. 20 Md. App. at 133, 316 A.2d at 841-42 (emphasis deleted).
11. Id. at 139-40, 316 A.2d at 845. This was the standard expressed in the jury instruction.
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must be weighed favorably for the party against whom the motion was
made.' 2 Thus, where reasonable minds could differ, such as arose here
due to the lack of evidence with regard to Spence's total motivation,
the issue is one of fact for the jury rather than one of law for the
court.' 3
In addressing itself to the overriding issue of this case, whether Sears
should be held liable for the intentional slanderous statements uttered
by Spence, the court stated the law of respondeat superior to be as
follows:
An act is within the scope of the servant's employment where
necessary to accomplish the purpose of his employment and
intended for that purpose, although in excess of the powers
actually conferred upon the servant by the master. That the act
was committed while the servant was on duty performing the
functions of his employment and it was committed for the
purpose of furthering the business of the master, rather than its
method of performance, is the test of employment. When a
wrong is committed by an employee in performing or attempt-
ing to perforrh the duties and functions of his employment it is
immaterial whether the injury was a result of negligence or
willful and wanton conduct; nor is it necessary that the master
should have known that the particular act was to be
done.... The question of liability does not depend on the
quality of the act, but rather upon the question whether it has
been performed in the line of duty and within the scope of the
authority conferred by the master.' 4
The first courts to examine a master's vicarious responsibility for the
unauthorized willful torts of his servants unanimously refused to ex-
tend liability to the master.' s Subsequently, the theory developed
whereby a command could be "implied" from the employment rela-
tionship, resulting in the imputation of liability to the employer.'6
This position was based upon the premise that a master is liable in such
an action by virtue of his own acts or omissions or because of the
master-servant relationship in which he is situated.' " Under the doc-
12. Id. at 134, 316 A.2d at 842.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 138, 316 A.2d at 844 (emphasis added).
15. See generally Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W.2d 382 (1951); Wright v.
Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343 (N.Y. 1838); Baskett v. Banks, 186 Va. 1022, 45 S.E.2d 173 (1947); T.
BATY, VicAmous LAAniLrry, ch. 1 (1916); J. WIGMORE, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: It's
History, 7 HARv. L. REV. 315 (1894).
16. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Dowling, 43 Ga. App. 549, 159 S.E. 609 (1931); Combs v.
Kobacker Stores, 65 Ohio L. Abs. 326, 114 N.E.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1953); T. BATY,
VicAmous LiArnur, 107 (1916); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *429-46;" M. FERSON,
Basis for Master's Liability to Third Persons, 4 VAND. L. REV. 260 (1951); W. SEAVEY,
Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 433, 451 (1934).
17. There are three relationships which fall within the purview of the doctrine of respondeat
superior. Traditionally, the master-servant relationship and more recently the relation-
ships of employer-employee and principal-agent have been included. Although there are
technical differences between these relationships this article will consider their meanings
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trine of respondeat superior a master is liable for injury to person or
property resulting from the acts of his servant done within the scope of
his employment in the master's service."6
There are two primary requirements which are conditions precedent
to the utilization of the doctrine: (1) an authentic master-servant
relationship must exist in order for the master to be properly charged
with the servant's act as if it were his own;' 9 and, (2) the servant's
tortious conduct must be committed within the scope of his employ-
nent.20 The scope of employment concept, however, due to its his-
torically obscure nature, is not susceptible to minute delineation. In
making this determination, the courts traditionally analyze the au-
thority conferred upon the servant who was responsible for the tortious
act,2 ' and more importantly, closely scrutinize the relationship be-
tween the tort committed and the servant's authority.2 2 Furthermore,
those acts done with either express or implied authority2 3 are within
the scope of employment of the servant.2 4
In interpreting the "scope of employment" concept there are two
distinct constructions: strict and liberal. Those courts which strictly
construe scope of employment confine it so as to not include torts of a
willful nature, while the broader scope utilized by the "liberalized"
courts considers a willful tort to be within the parameters of scope of
employment. Additionally, there are two separate branches of the strict
constructionist approach. Those allied with the narrower of the two
as being synonomous with each other. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Hinson, 191 Ark. 617, 87
S.W. 66 (1935); Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Strube, 111 Md. 119, 73 A. 697- (1909).
18. A master is responsible for want of care on the part of his servant toward those whom the
master owes a duty to use care, provided the servant's failure to use care occurred in the
course of his employment. Vivion v. National Cash Register Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 597, 19
Cal. Rptr. 602 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Lange v. National Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783
(Minn. 1973); Blasinay v. Albert Wenzlick Real Estate Co., 235 Mo. App. 526, 138 S.W.2d
721 (1940); Hantke v. Harris Ice Machine Works, 152 Ore. 465, 54 P.2d 293 (1936).
19. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451 (1880).
20. Draper v. Oliver Paving & Constr. Co., 54 Del. 43, 181 A.2d 565 (1964); Klatt v. Common-
wealth Edison Co., 33 ll.2d 481, 211 N.E.2d 720.(1965).
21. See, eog., Dusquesne Distrib. Co. v. Greenbaum, 135 Ky. 182, 121 S.W. 102A (1909): Drug
Fair of Maryland, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971); Pesio v. Sherman, 285
Minn. 246, 171 N.W.2d 748 (1969). Scope of authority is one of the elements necessary
to establish whether or not a particular act was committed within the "scope of
employment." The loose application of these concepts has created the mistaken impres-
sion that they are synonomous with one another. The court in Hopkins Chem. Co. v. Read
Drug & Chem. Co., 124 Md. 210, 211, 92 A. 479, 480 (1914), recognized this by noting:
"The simple test is whether [the acts were] within the scope of his employment;...
whether they were done by the servant in furtherance [of the master's business and)...
have been authorized." (emphasis added).
22. J. J. Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S.W.2d 359 (1935); Sanders v. Day, 2 Wash.
App. 393, 468 P.2d 452 (1970).
23. Pesio v. Sherman, 285 Minn. 246, 172 N.W.2d 748 (1969); Hinkle v. Chicago B. & Q. R.R.
Co., 199 S.W. 227"(Mo. 1917).
24. Express authority is that which is specifically delegated by the master to the servant, while
implied authority is that which may be inferred from the employment relationship or
incidental to it. Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W.2d 382 (1951); Wright v. Wilcox,
19 Wend. 343 (N.Y. 1838): Baskett v. Banks, 186 Va. 1022, 45 S.E.2d 173 (1947); 2 F.
MECHE, AGENCY §§ 1929. 1960 (2d ed. 1914); Rzs'TTEmErr (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 228
et. seq. (1958).
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branches have taken the position that a willful tort is, per se, outside
the scope of employment, 2 s while those espousing the other view have
modified this principle by holding that a willful tort is only prima facie
evidence of an act being outside the scope of employment.2 6 The
rationale applied in these decisions is that public policy is best served
by refusing to permit recovery against the master. Due to the willful
nature of the servant's tortious conduct, the master lacked the requisite
control over these actions, therefore, liability should not attach.
Under the strict construction doctrine, the master "must only re-
spond" when the tortious act of the servant occurs in the furtherance
of the master's business.2 7 Thus, an intentional tort, by its very nature,
is an independent act of the, wrongdoer and does not further the
interests of the employer. There is, however, an exception to this
position in which the master's business would be served by a willfully
tortious act, notwithstanding the fact that the tort is outside the scope
of employment.2 Those situations in which the service to be rendered
impliedly necessitates, authorizes, or at least anticipates a willful tort
are exemplary of this exception. 2 9 Although these situations approxi-
mate actual authorization, the courts have held the master liable on the
theory that the authorization arose from the employment rather than
the employer? 0 The authority is considered implied from or incidental
to the nature of the employment." It can be deduced from these
25. Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. 343 (N.Y. 1838), a willful tort was deemed as a stepping stone
from the course of employment; Barry v. Oregon Trunk Ry., 197 Ore. 246, 253 P.2d 260
(1953).
26. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v. Reed, 80 Tex. 362, 15 S.W. 1105 (1891); see O'Roark v. Gergley, 497
S.W.2d 931 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973).
27. Bradlow v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 131 Conn. 192, 38 A.2d 679 (1944); Atlanta Baseball
Co. v. Lawrence, 38 Ga. App. 497, 144 S.E. 351 (1928); Horton v. Jones, 208 Miss. 257, 44
So. 2d 397 (1950); Mandel v. Byram, 191 Wisc. 446, 211 N.W. 145 (1926); cf. Pina v. Nar-
ragansett Dounuts, Inc., 304 A.2d 655 (R.I. 1973); 3 T. COOLEY, TORTS § 393 (4th ed. 1932);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 214, 228 (1958); Book Note, 45 HAnv. L. Rav. 342
(1931).
28. Examples of this exception are common where the servant is a bartender or a security
guard. In these situations, respectively, a servant may have authority to quell a
disturbance but not to assault customers, or a security guard may have authority to
question an alleged shoplifter, but not to falsely imprison that customer. When this occurs,
often the employer is held liable notwithstanding the fact that the servant's act is not
within the scope of his employment. See note 62 infra.
29. See, e.g., Stewart v. Reutler, 32 Cal. App. 2d 195, 89 P.2d 402 (1939); Lange v. Na-
tional Biscuit Co., 211 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1973); Schmidt v. Vanderveer, 110 App. Div.
755, 97 N.Y.S. 441 (1906); F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 396 (4th ed.
1952).
30. Guillen v. Kuykendall, 470 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Dowling,
43 Ga. App. 549, 159 S.E. 609 (1931); Freedman v. Martin, 43 Ga. App. 677, 160 S.E. 126
(1931); Gillis v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 223 N.C. 470, 27 S.E.2d 283 (1943); Combs v.
Kobacker Stores. 65 Ohio L. Abs. 326, 114 N.E.2d 447 (Ct. App. 1953); RESTATEMENT
OF AGENCY § 245 (1933); 2 F. MECHEM § 1982 (2d ed.1914).
31. Sanders v. Day, 2 Wash. App. 393, 468 P.2d 452 (1970). Although scope of employment is
not susceptible to clear and concise definition, there has surfaced a recent trend in which
certain courts have adopted a more systematic approach in dealing with the problems in-
volved in determining scope of authority. The RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY has provided the
methodology for determining scope of authority:
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decisions, that in jurisdictions adhering to a strict construction of the
scope of employment requirement, the master is not subject to liability
for the intentional or willful torts of his servant unless the former can
be held for his own omissions, or unless the type of employment, by its
nature, either expressly or impliedly authorizes the commission of such
torts.
The concept of the master's non-culpability for the willful torts of
his servant has been subjected to widespread liberalization by which a
servant's willful tort is more readily imputed to the master. The
jurisdictions adhering to this position, which now constitute the major-
ity, reason that the liberalization is warranted since it is the duty of an
employer to assure that the acts authorized by his employee are
properly performed. In effect, the acts of a servant are the acts of the
master, at least in that they would not be performed "but for" the
design of the master.3 2 Since a master would be liable for his own
torts, he should be liable for such torts committed while he was
constructively acting.3 3
Prichard v. Gilbert3 4 presents an example of this liberalized interpre-
tation of scope of employment, wherein the court held that even in a
situation where the servant is not furthering the master's business, the
master could become liable for the actions resulting from the personal
animosity of the servant. In Pritchard, the employer's salesman was
driving a company-owned car home from a night sales meeting. The
plaintiff swerved his car while passing the defendant salesman, forcing
the defendant's car off the road. The enraged salesman then reversed
direction, pursued the plaintiff and forced him to stop. The salesman
then proceeded to assault and inflict serious bodily injury upon the
plaintiff. The court, in finding the employer liable, concluded that as
long as the assault originated out of a dispute which arose in the scope
(2) In determining whether or not the conduct, although not authorized, is
nevertheless so similar to or incidental to the conduct authorized as to be within the
scope of employment, the following matters are to be considered:
(a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such servants;
(b) the time, place and purpose of the act;
(c) the previous relations between the master and the servant;
(d) the extent to which the business of the master is apportioned between differ-
ent servants;
(e) whether or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master or, if within the
enterprise, has not been entrusted to any servant;
(f) whether or not the master has reason to expect that such an act will be done;
(g) the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized;...
(i) the extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing an au-
thorized result; ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 229 (1958).
32. Some courts have adopted the tort concept of sine qua non and applied it to agency
relationships, holding, "but for" the master's employing the servant the tort would not
have been committed.
33. F. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 359 (4th ed. 1952).
34. 107 Cal. App. 2d 1, 236 P.2d 412 (1951); accord, Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Ellington,
92 Ga. App. 24, 87 S.E.2d 665 (1955).
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of employment, no intent to further the business of the master need be
found. The assault by the employee was merely one of the risks his
employer must bear,3" even though the act was not in furtherance of
his employer's business pursuits. The only recognized limitation arises
when the employee completely abandons his employment at the time
of the commission of the tort and is wholly serving his own personal
desires.3  Pritchard, being an apparent contradiction to this limitation,
can only be explained by the court's factual determination that the
actions committed did not constitute total abandonment.
Despite the irreconcilable division between the strict and liberal
viewpoints, the doctrine of respondeat superior is still stated as subject-
ing the master to liability for. any tortious acts of his servants com-
mitted within the scope of their employment. The conflict has come to
bear in the application of the scope of employment requirement. In this
determination the dispositive factor is the causal relationship between
the authority conferred upon the servant and the tort committed. This
factor undergoes its most extreme test when the tort of slander has
been committed. The jurisdictions are divided on the question of
whether such an utterance can conceivably fall within the scope of
employment.
Although the majority rule states that a willful tort, such as slander,
may be within the scope of employment,3 ' there does exist a substan-
tial and vocal minority. 3" The latter view takes the position that the
traditional scope of employment test is inapplicable in cases founded
upon a slanderous utterance. 3 9 This school of thought reasons that the
offense of slander is a voluntary act of the speaker, and thereby is more
likely to be an expression of momentary passion or excitement. Thus, it
logically follows that such an utterance, clearly unauthorized, must be
35. See Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Ellington, 92 Ga. App. 24, 87 S.E.2d 655 (1955);
Korhorn v. Smith, 3 Il. App. 3d 532, 278 N.E.2d 864 (1971). The majority of jurisdictions
would construe scope of employment more narrowly, reaching a different conclusion.
Although the act of driving home from a meeting was within the scope of employment,
the assault after a lengthy pursuit can be considered an act entirely dissociated from the
employment and could have been regarded as a departure from the service. The salesman
stated at trial that his purpose was to stop an incompetent driver.
36. Hickson v. W. W. Walker Co., 110 Conn. 604, 149 A. 400 (1930); Sandman v. Hagan, 154
N.W.2d 113 (Iowa 1967).
37. See, eg., Drug Fair of Maryland, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971); Luz v.
Stop & Shop, Inc. of Peabody, 348 Mass. 198, 202 N.E.2d 771 (1964); Lange v. National
Biscuit Co., 221 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 1973).
38. See note 39 infra.
39. Duquesne Distrib. Co. v. Greenbaum, 135 Ky. 182, 121 S.W. 1026 (1909). The court stated
that it is insufficient to prove solely that the servant or agent at the time of the commis-
sion of the tortious act was engaged in the service of the master or principal, or acting
within the scope of employment. It must be further shown that the principal directed or
authorized the agent to speak the actionable words, or afterwards approves or ratifies their
speaking. See e.g., Mathews v. U.S. Rubber Co., 219 F. Supp. 831 (E.D.S.C. 1963); World
Ins. Co. v. Peavy, 110 Ga. App. 527, 139 S.E.2d 155 (1964); McKown v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 99 Ga. App. 120, 107 S.E.2d 883 (1959); Miller v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc.,
304 N.E.2d 573 (Mass. 1973); cf. Fordson Coal Co. v. Carter, 269 Ky. 805, 108 S.W.2d 1007




ascribed to the personal malice of the servant rather than to an act
performed in the course of his employment. This position was articu-
lated in Duquesne Distributing Co. v. GreenbauM,4 0 wherein the court
noted:
Slanderous words are easily spoken, are usually uttered under
the influence of passion or excitement, and more frequently
than otherwise are the voluntary thought and act of the
speaker. Or, to put it in another way, the words spoken are not
generally prompted by or put into the mouth of the speaker by
any other person, and represent nothing more than his personal
views or opinions about the person or thing spoken of. If
principals or masters could be held liable for every defamatory
utterance of their servants or agents while in their service, it
would subject them to liability that they could not protect or
guard against. No person can reasonably prevent another, not
immediately in his presence, from giving expression to his
voluntary opinions, however defamatory they may be.4
The majority, adhering to the liberal position, reasons that there
is no distinction between willful and non-intentional torts with regard
to the doctrine of respondeat superior.4 2 The only apparent exception
to this assertion is that it has not been extended so as to include a
situation in which the willful tort emanated solely from the servant's
personal motives, bearing no relation to his employment. 4 3 The basic
rule has been narrowed whereby some courts have held that in order for
liability to attach, the slanderous utterance of the servant must not
only be within the scope of employment, but must also be in further-
ance of the principal's business.4 4 Those espousing this view reason
that no distinction is warranted as to the willful or the non-willful
nature of the tort, since in either situation the tort would not have been
committed but for the principal's employment of the agent. Thus, the
equities demand that the prinicipal assume liability.
The case of West v. F. W. Woolworth Co.4 s exemplifies the outer
reaches to which this doctrine has been extended. Therein, the em-
ployee was given express instructions "to never, under any circum-
40. 135 Ky. 182, 121 S.W. 1026 (1909).
41. Id. at 185, 121 S.W. at 1028.
42. See, e.g., Wells v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc.. 474 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1973); Jones v. Sears.
Roebuck & Co., 459 F.2d 584 (6th Cir. 1972); Malvo v. J. C. Penney Inc., 512 P.2d 575
(Alas. 1973); Gillis v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 223 N.C. 470, 27 S.E.2d 283 (1943).
43. See, e.g., Wells v. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 474 F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1973) (dissenting opinion);
Craft v. Magnolia Stores Co., 161 Miss. 756, 138 So. 405 (1931); Hammond v. Eckerd's of
Asheville, Inc., 220 N.C. 596, 18 S.E.2d 151 (1942); cf. Sullivan v. Morrow, 504 S.W.2d 767
(Tenn. 1973); E. Hun'ctn, LAW OF AGENcy 305-06 (1901).
44. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Bridwell, 103 Ark. 345. 147 S.W. 64 (1912) (emphasis added): see,
e.g., Wntesman v. Pettis Dry Goods Co., 82 Ind. App. 504, 146 N.E. 835 (1925); Grist v.
Upjohn, 368 Mich. 578, 118 N.W.2d 985 (1962). Contra, Smedley v. Life and Cas. Ins. Co.
of Tennessee, 221 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
45. 215 N.C. 211, 1 S.E.2d 546 (1939).
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stances, charge any person with theft." 6 Nonetheless, the agent ac-
cused the plaintiff of having committed a larceny. In holding Wool-
worth vicariously liable, the court reasoned that "[w]hile the actual
authority of the employee is usually material in determining the scope
of his employment, it is not determinative of the liability of the
principal.'4 7 This seemingly inconsistent conclusion was based upon
the theory that employer's rarely, if ever, specifically instruct their
employees to commit tortious acts. Rather, there exists within the
master's instructions an implied order that such acts are unauthorized.
Recognizing the fact that secondary responsibility may arise under
appropriate situations despite this implied instruction, the court found
that no distinction is warranted in those situations where the employer
attempted to expressly exculpate himself of any liability. As can be
seen from the above discussion, whether an employer will be com-
pelled to respond for the willful torts of his servants is determined by
the proportionate emphasis given to the following considerations:
scope of employment, scope of authority, and the nature of the
intentional tort.4 8 In the consideration of these tenets the Maryland
courts have vacillated between the strict and liberal constructions of
the doctrine of respondeat superior.4 9 The early interpretations of
scope of employment were extremely narrow. A master was responsible
for the acts of his servant, if and only if the tortious act occurred while
the latter was engaged in the performance of the specific service for
which he was employed."0 The limits of the doctrine were subse-
quently liberalized through decisions in which a master's liability was
extended to those acts committed within the scope of employment.
The act must also have been within the limits of implied authority,
however "erroneous, mistaken, or malicious."" Thus, for those acts
beyond such limits, no liability resulted unless they were expressly
authorized or subsequently ratified by the master. 2
As the law became more refined a differentiation between scope of
authority and scope of employment began to develop." 3 Drug Fair of
Maryland, Inc. v. Smith,14 the most recent Maryland case prior to
46. Id. at 212, 1 S.E.2d at 547.
47. Id. at 214, 1 S.E.2d at 548 (emphasis added). See also Smedley v. Life and Cas. Ins. Co. of
Tennessee, 221 F. Supp. 119 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
48. O'Brien v. B. L. M. Bates Corp., 211 App. Div. 743, 208 N.Y.S. 110 (1925); see Drug Fair of
Maryland, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971); Sandrock v. Taylor, 185 Neb.
106, 174 N.W.2d 186 (1970).
49. Compare Adams v. Cost, 62 Md. 264 (1884) with Newton v. Spence, 20 Md. App. 126, 316
A.2d 837 (1974).
50. 62 Md. 264 (1884).
51. McCrory Stores Corp. v. Satchell, 148 Md. 279, 285, 129 A. 348, 350 (1925). The
defendant's manager mistakenly accused the plaintiff of larceny. The court held that as
long as the agent was acting under the impression that the plaintiff had in fact stolen
merchandise and so acted with authority, the principal could be held liable.
52. Id.
53. Globe Indem. Co. v. Victill Corp., 208 Md. 573, 119 A.2d 423 (1956); Great Ati. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Noppenberger, 171 Md. 378, 189 A. 434 (1937).
54. 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971).
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Newton to examine the doctrine of respondeat superior, specifically
noted that an authorization, either express or implied, to commit a
certain act, is a necessary prerequisite to the invocation of the doc-
trine.5 5 As a result, authority has continued to be a paramount con-
sideration in determining the master's liability for his servant's inten-
tional conduct." 6
Safeway Stores v. Barrack' ' is exemplary of this position. An
employee of the defendant store apprehended the plaintiff and accused
him of having committed a larceny from the store. The employee, a
security guard, was hired for the purpose of detecting and prosecuting
shoplifters. Since the guard's tortious actions in the case at bar were
deemed to be in the regular course of his employment the employer
was held secondarily liable.5 ' By carefully scrutinizing the nature of
the job for which the employee was hired, other Maryland decisions
have limited Safeway. The Maryland Court of Appeals in Birnheimer v.
Becker 9 recognized the significance of the task to be performed by
the agent. Unlike the situation in Safeway, the employee in Birnheimer
was not hired for the purpose of accosting shoplifters. Noting this
distinction to be controlling, the court refused to extend liability to the
principal on the theory that an ordinary agent was not authorized with
the power that was exercised therein.' 0 Thus, the implied authority
doctrine was not allowed to serve as a vehicle through which the courts
could categorically hold a principal liable."' The Safeway and Birn-
heimer decisions thereby established guidelines for the courts to utilize
in their determination of whether a particular tortious act of a servant
could be said to have occurred within the scope of authority conferred
upon him.' 2
When ascertaining the servant's implied authority the character of
the position occupied and the duties incidental to it are decisive
elements.' 3 In studying the character of the position of a servant who
has no express authority to protect the master's property, the title of
55. Id. at 346, 283 A.2d at 395, quoting Globe Indemnity Co. v. Victill Corp., 208 Md. 573, 119
A.2d 423 (1956).
56. Drug Fair of Maryland, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971); Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Noppenberger, 171 Md. 378, 189 A. 434 (1937).
57. 210 Md. 168, 122 A.2d 457 (1956).
58. Id. at 174, 122 A.2d at 460.
59. 102 Md. 250, 62 A. 526 (1905); accord, Drug Fair of Maryland, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341,
283 A.2d 392 (1971); Central RR Co. v. Brewer, 78 Md. 394, 26 A. 392 (1894).
60. 102 Md. at 255-56, 62 A.2d at 528.
61. Id. at 255, 62 A.2d at 528, where an ordinary sales clerk falsely imprisoned and assaulted a
customer whom he thought had commited a larcenous act. The court said that since such
agent's actions were neither authorized nor within the scope of his employment, no liability
would be imputed to the principal.
62. See, eg., Stewart v. Ruetler, 32 Cal. App. 2d 195, 89 P.2d 402 (1939) (bouncer); J. J.
Newberry Co. v. Judd, 259 Ky. 309, 82 S.W.2d 359 (1935) (store manager); Schmidt v.
Vanderveer, 110 App. Div. 775, 97 N.Y.S. 441 (1906) (guard); Ploof v. Putman, 83 Vt. 252.
75 A. 277 (1910) (caretaker); see M. FEsoN, PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY § 396 (4th ed. 1952); F.
M.CHEm, OuTLINEs OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 253 (1946).
63. See, e.g., East Coast Freight Lines, Inc. v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 190 Md.
256, 58 A.2d 290 (1948); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Noppenberger, 171 Md. 378, 189 A.
434 (1937); McCrory Stores Corp. v. Satchell, 148 Md. 279, 129 A. 348 (1925).
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"manager" carries an inference that such a person's acts are the acts of
the employer, due to the fact that a manager is entrusted with the
general management and custody of the entire business. This, in turn,
renders the employer liable when such an employee causes the false
imprisonment, slander, or malicious prosecution, provided the em-
ployee intends to protect the employer's property. Such actions are
considered incidental to and consistent with the general scope of such
employee's employment. 4
Conversely, implied authority that is supervisory in nature does not
arise for those employees below the level of "manager" or "assistant-
manager."' 5 Since the protection of the master's property is not
normally entrusted to a servant of this capacity, nor is it his implied
duty to protect the property of his employer, no liability attaches to
the master. 6 ' An exception arises with regard to those employees,
regardless of their technical title, who have been expressly delegated the
duty of protecting the master's property. An implied authority to do
everything reasonable and necessary to effectuate said delegation is
created. Despite this exception, the master cannot be held liable for
the tortious conduct originating from the servant's personal motives or
malice.6 7
The significance of Newton v. Spence lies not in how the controversy
between the parties before this court was resolved, but rather in the
decision's ramifications upon future jural relationships similarly
situated. This prognosis is predicated on the appellate court's deter-
mination that the jury instruction, with regard to Sears' liability for
Spence's action, "fully conforms with Maryland law on the subject.""'
The salient portion of the instruction states that "Sears would be
responsible if the jury found Spence was acting within the scope of his
employment and in furtherance of the business of Sears .. . ."6' A
paradox arises when this analysis is compared with the court's own
prior contradictory statement of the law where the court propounded
scope of authority to be one of the essential elements necessary before
vicarious responsibility will attach.7 0 In addition, the Court of Special
Appeals' characterization of the jury instruction to be in "full con-
formity with the Maryland law,"'7 1 is in fact a misstatement of the
law.7 2 Prior to Newton, the trend of significantly emphasizing author-
64. See, e.g., Lewis Accelerated Trans.-Pony Express, Inc., 219 Md. 252, 148 A.2d 783 (1959);
McCrory Stores Corp. v. Satchell, 148 Md. 279, 129 A. 348 (1925).
65. 219 Md. 252, 148 A.2d 783 (1959).
66. Id. at 255, 148 A.2d at 785.
67. Drug Fair of Maryland, Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971). But cf. Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Rasche, 130 Md. 126, 99 A. 991 (1917).
68. 20 Md. App. at 139, 316 A.2d at 845.
69. Id.
70. See pp. 176 supra.
71. 20 Md. App. at 139, 306 A.2d at 845.
72. The overwhelming majority of courts consider scope of authority to be an essential element
as a condition precedent in determining liability for the master. Drug Fair of Maryland,
Inc. v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971); Le Pore v. Gulf Oil Corp., 237 Md. 591,
207 A.2d 451 (1965); Sandrock v. Taylor, 185 Neb. 106, 174 N.W.2d 186 (1970).
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ity in determining an employer's liability had guided the Maryland
courts. Newton, by failing to specifically consider scope of authority,
materially altered this trend. Newton v. Spence thus gains its promi-
nence in that it broadens the possible range of a principal's liability. As
a result, Maryland has assumed a position in the outermost regions of
those jurisdictions liberally construing scope of employment, placing it
practically in a class by itself."3 Had the trial court closely examined
the scope of Spence's authority, it is clear that its decision would have
been different, since neither express nor implied authority was con-
ferred upon him. Nor can it be shown that the accusations by Spence
were incidental to his duties as a clerk. Such a conclusion arises from
the fact that Spence, being a subordinate agent 7 4 with few supervisory
functions, was not entrusted with those powers normally relegated to
managerial personnel. Thus, the acts committed were totally unrelated
to his official duties.
Newton gave lip-service to the characterization of the law articulated
in the North Carolina case of West v. F. W. Woolworth,7" whereby
liability is imputed to the employer only when it is established that the
tortious conduct occurred within the scope of employment, was in
furtherance of the employer's business and was authorized. However, it
is evident from the decision in Newton that the application of the
above law was by no means entirely dispositive to the court's holding.
Such a conclusion is undeniable by virtue of the fact that Newton only
adopted the first two of the above premises.7 6 Thus, the non-disposi-
tive tenet must only be classified as judicial dictum.
Subsequent North Carolina cases relying on Woolworth have reached
the same interpretation as Newton. A progeny of those interpretations
emerged in Branch v. Dempsey7 where the court espoused the follow-
ing rule of law:
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, vicarious liability
to third persons is imposed upon the master for the servant's
torts, not because he authorized the particular act, but because
the servant is conducting the master's business, and because the
social interest in the general security is best maintained by
holding those who conduct enterprises in which others are
employed to an absolute liability for what their servants do in
the course of the enterprise.?
Branch, being indicative of the next logical step to Newton's interpreta-
73. Only the North Carolina construction is farther reaching than the present Maryland posi-
tion. See Branch v. Dempsey, 265 N.C. 733, 145 S.E.2d 395 (1965).
74. 20 Md. App. at 128, 316 A.2d at 839. In considering the totality of Spence's responsibilities
as a full-time clerk it is clear that the authority conferred upon him was only subordinate
in nature.
75. 215 N.C. 211, 1 S.E.2d 546 (1939).
76. 29 Md. at 139, 316 A.2d at 845.
77. 265 N.C. 33, 145 S.E.2d 395 (1965).
78. Id. at 737, 147 S.E.2d at 408, quoting Porter v. Grennan Bakeries, 219 Minn. 14, 16
N.W.2d 906 (1944) (emphasis added).
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tion of Woolworth, significantly reveals Maryland's future posture in
the area of respondeat superior. The absolute liability of the master
seems to be an inevitable result.
Barry Genkin
CRIMINAL LAW- JUDICIAL AFFIRMANCE OF THE VALIDITY
OF THE YEAR AND A DAY RULE IN MARYLAND. STATE V.
BROWN, 21 Md. App. 91,318 A.2d 257 (1974).
A mortal wound rarely claims its victim more than a year after the
fatal infliction. The common law established the rule that, in order to
constitute felonious homicide, death of the victim must occur within a
year and a day after the fatal act.
In State v. Brown,' a case of first impression, the Court of Special
Appeals addressed itself to the applicability of the year and a day rule
in Maryland. The appellee was indicted for the murder of his wife. It
was not disputed that the decedent, who lingered almost two years
before she died, was injured by the appellee.2 The Criminal Court of
Baltimore, in granting the appellee's motion to dismiss the indictment,
found the year and a day rule to be valid and viable in Maryland. Upon
appeal by the State, the Court of Special Appeals, in affirming the trial
court's decision, held that the year and a day rule is in "full force and
effect in Maryland." 3 Although the Brown court recognized the ad-
vancements made by medical science, it was not prepared to conclude
that the rule is presently anachronistic.4 Adjudging any alteration of
the rule by judicial discretion inappropriate, the court reasoned that if
change in the rule was to occur, it should be by the General Assembly.'
The rule is not intended to be a statute of limitations on an
indictment for felonious homicide.' It is a test of proximate causation
1. 21 Md. App. 91, 318 A.2d 257 (1974).
2. Appellee had pleaded guilty to assault with intent to murder and was subsequently sen-
tenced to a six-year prison term notwithstanding the fact that the State had recom-
mended a five-year sentence. Brief for Appellant at 2.
3. 21 Md. App. at 97, 318 A.2d at 261. The State, in its brief, had not disputed the validity
of the common law rule in Maryland but had urged abrogation of the rule. Brief for
Appellant at 2.
4. Id. See also notes 63-65 infra.
5. Id. See also note 62 infra.
6. A statute of limitations connotes the time in which a prosecution can be brought after
the completion of the crime, which, in the case of'murder, does not commence until the
death of the victim. Because the overwhelming majority of states do not limit prosecution
for murder, prosecution may be brought at any time during the life of the offender. See,
e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-502 (1972); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3106(1) (Supp. 1972).
Contra, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40A-1-8 (1953), no person shall be prosecuted for a capital
felony unless an indictment can be found, information or complaint filed within ten years
from the time the crime is committed. A number of states do limit the prosecution period
for felonies other than murder. See, e.g., Omo REv. CODE § 2929.11 (1974), prosecution for
all felonies other than aggravated murder or murder is barred unless commenced within
six years after the offense.
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